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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STEEL FARMS, INC.,
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Appellant,
v

CROFT & REED, INC.,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Respondents

**************
Supplemental
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

**************
Appeal from the District COUli ofthe
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in and for the County of Bonneville

HONORABLE Joel E. Tingey, District Judge.

**************
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HOLDEN, KIDWELL, HAHN & CRAPO
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Nathan M. Olsen
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DISTRICT COURT SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BONNEVILLE COUNTY IDAHO
STEEL FARMS, INC.
Case No.: CV-08-7912

Plaintiff,
vs.
CROFT & REED, INC.,
Defendant.
------------------------------~

CROFT & REED, INC.'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF ITS
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

CROFT & REED, INC.

Counterclaimant,
vs.
STEEL FARMS, INC.; DOUG STEEL,
individually; and KEVIN STEEL,
individually,
Counterdefendants.
DefendantiCounterclaimant, Croft & Reed, Inc. (Croft & Reed), by and through
counsel of record, Beard S1. Clair Gaffney PA, submits the following memorandum in
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment. This memorandum is supported by the
affidavits of counsel, Nathan M. Olsen, Virginia R. Mathews, and Russell J. Mathews
filed herewith.
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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INTRODUCTION

The Plaintiff, Steel Farms, Inc. (Steel Farms), has filed a complaint to enforce an
option to purchase (Option) Croft & Reed's real property located in Bonneville County.
A 2004 four-year written lease agreement (Lease) between the parties purports to contain
an enforceable purchase Option. However, Steel Farms is prevented from exercising the
Option for any of the following reasons:
1)

The Lease only allows exercise of the Option during the period of the

lease or any "extension" of the lease. The Option cannot occur during a
"holdover" period. The Lease expired on March 1, 2008, and was never extended.
Steel Farms was therefore unable to exercise the Option after March 1,2008. The
clear language of the Lease prevents exercise of the Option during the initial
period of the lease essentially makes the Option illusory unless and until the lease
would be extended.
2)

The Lease strictly and broadly prevents Steel Farms from selling,

assigning or encumbering its interest under the Lease without the written consent
of Croft & Reed, the violation of which voids the Option. This provision of the
Lease was violated when Steel Farms entered into a written option agreement
with a third party to purchase Croft & Reeds property without Croft & Reed's
written consent.
3)

Even if the Option is valid, Steel Farms is also prohibited from exercising

the Option because they are in default under the Lease, having violated the law.
The 2004 Lease and Option was drafted by Steel Farms' attorney and negotiated
with Croft and Reed's president Richard "Dick" Reed six days before his death in April
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Supportpfits Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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of2004. As construed against the drafter, the Option could not be exercised without an
extension to the lease. The agreement cannot be reformed because the principal parties
for Croft & Reed are no longer alive and therefore any alleged mistakes and/or the intent
behind the terms of the agreement cannot ever be known or proven with clear and
convincing evidence. The Option portion of the contract is therefore invalid and Croft &
Reed's motion should be granted.
MATERIAL FACTS
Generally

On or about April 22, 2004, Croft & Reed entered into a four year written Lease
with Steel Farms for agricultural land owned by Croft &Reed and farmed by Steel Farms
approximately 10 miles west ofldaho Falls, Idaho on HWY 20. (V. Mathews Aff.,[ 6,
Ex. B) The lease was drafted by Steel Farms attorney, Greg Ehardt. (Cite) Croft &
Reed's president and stockholder, Dick Reed, died six days after signing the agreement.
(ld. at ~ 4). Croft & Reed's other stockholder at that time, Velma Reed, passed away on

November 1,2007. (Id. at ~ 5). Croft & Reed alleges that certain errors in the Lease
invalidates an option to purchase provision found in the agreement because of a lack of
the "meeting of the minds" or a failure to meet the writing requirements ofldaho's
Statute of Frauds. (See Defendant's and Counterclaimant's Answer and Counterclaims).
Croft & Reed also believes that parties involved in the 2004 transaction may have lacked
proper capacity to bind Croft & Reed to the Lease. (Id.) However, for the purpose of
this summary judgment motion only, Croft & Reed will assume Steel Farm's position
that the Lease is a valid and binding agreement between the parties is legally correct
1. Holdover and Option Terms of the Lease

Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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The Lease indicates that the term and possession of the Lease commenced on the
effective date ofthe agreement, April 22, 2004, and ended on the 1st day of March, 2008.
(V. Mathews Aff.

~

6, Ex. B. Lease Sec. 3.l). The agreement further states that rent

during the term (or any holdover) shall be $40,000 per year. (Jd. at Sec. 4.1 of Lease. See
also Olsen AfT. Ex. A "Modified Lease" at Sec. 4.1). The first page of the Lease consists
of a summary of certain lease provisions. (Jd. Page 1 of Lease and Modified Lease). The
lease term is stated as four years. (Jd.) Steel Farms has judicially admitted the four year
term of the Lease in its verified complaint. (See Complt.

~~6,

8)

Section 19 of the Lease consists of a provision purporting to grant Steel Farms an
option to purchase the premises upon certain temlS and conditions. (V. Mathews Aff.
Ex. B at Sec. 19 of Lease. See also Olsen Aff. Ex. A "Modified Lease" at Sec. 19).
Section 19.9.1. of the Lease requires that to exercise the option, Steel Farms must give
written notice to exercise the option to Croft & Reed:
[.SJubsequent to the maturity of this option on July 15,2008, and during the Term
of this lease (including any agreed extension or exercised option term but
excluding any holdover term).

***
Any attempt to exercise the Option that does not strictly comply with this
paragraph is void and does not constitute an effective exercise (of) the option.
(Jd.) (emphasis added)

As the Lease was written and signed in 2004, the Option could not be exercised
during the period of the Lease. In order for the Option to be validly exercised, the parties
would have been required to extend the Lease in such manner as prescribed under the
Lease and under the appropriate authority prescribed under Croft & Reed's bylaws.
Section 2004 of the Lease provides that the agreement may be:
Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support jlf its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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[A ]altered, amended or revoked only by an instrument in writing signed by both
(Croft & Reed) and (Steel Farms.)

(ld. at Sec. 20.4).
On December 28, 1961, Croft & Reed approved bylaws for the management of
the corporation. (V. Mathews Aff. Ex. B.) These bylaws were in effect in November of
2007. (V. Mathews AfT.

~

9) Article III, Section 1 of these bylaws requires the President

to approve all corporate "contracts and instruments" in writing which must have been
"first approved by the Board of Directors." (ld. Ex B.) Article VI of the bylaws provides
that "no contract by any officer of the company shall be valid without the previous
authorization or subsequent ratification of the President of the Board of Directors." (ld.)
The Lease was never extended according to either Section 19.19.1 of the Lease or
Croft & Reed's by laws. Certain notations that were made on the Lease in approximately
April 2006 were not made in accordance with the provisions of the Lease nor Croft &
Reed's bylaws and were therefore insufficient to modify or extend the Lease.
The Lease contains the following provision in Section 20.11 in regard to
holdovers:
If (Steel Farms) remains in possession of all or any part of the Premises after the
expiration of the term hereof, with or without the express or implied consent of
(Croft & Reed), such tenancy shall be from month to month only, and not a
renewal hereof or an extension for any further term, and in such case rent,
including percentage rent and other monetary sums due hereunder, shall be
payable in the amount and at the time specified in this Lease and such month
tenancy shall be subject to every other term, covenant and agreement contained
herein. (ld. at Sec. 20.11) (emphasis added)

2. Unauthorized encumbrance of interests
The Lease contains the following provision in Section 19.13 with regard to the
assignment or transfer of the Option:
Assignment or Transfer prohibited. (Steel Farms) shall not sell or contract to sell
or assign or contract to assign or otherwise transfer or hypothecate or assign as
security or pledge or otherwise encumber (Steel Farm's) interest in the Option or
Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support,.9f its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
~ ~
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the Premises or any part thereof separate from this lease without first obtaining
the written consent of Croft & Reed. (Id. at Sec. 19.13)
In direct violation of this provision, Steel Farms entered into a written "Option to
Purchase Real Property" agreement with Walker Land & Cattle, LLC (Walker Land) on
or about April 6th 2006. (A vondet Dec. 2009 Aff. Ex. A) This agreement provides an
option to Walker Land to purchase Croft & Reed's property "prior to the expiration" of
Steel Farms' lease with Croft & Reed. (Id. at "Recitals") Under the terms of the
agreement, Walker Land agreed to pay Steel Farms $832,830 "upon the exercise of the
option and at such time as (Steel Farms) shall own fee simple title to the Property." (Jd. at
Sec. 4) The agreement is signed by representatives from Steel Farms and Walker Land,
but not Croft & Reed. In fact, Croft & Reed was not aware that the written agreement
existed until it was provided in written discovery after Steel Farms filed its lawsuit in
January of 2009. 1
3. Sublease

On or about April 3, 2006, Steel Farms entered into a written sublease (Sublease)
with Walker Land & Cattle, LLC (Walker Land) in regard to the property that is subject
to the Lease. (Jd. at 9). This agreement was sent at Venna Reed's request by Steel Farms
to Croft & Reed's attorney for review and was signed by the parties on April 3, 2006.
(Jd.) The Sublease allowed Walker Land to take over operations of the property subject

to the provisions of the Sublease and the Lease. (Id. At Ex. C Sec. 1 of Sublease). The
Sublease further provides that Walker Farms "shall not take any action which shall
constitute a default or violation of the terms and provisions of the Lease." !d. The term of
the Sublease was from February 15,2006 through February 14,2007. The agreement
I

It is now clear that the genesis of this lawsuit seeking specific perfonnance is the agreement between

Steel Fanns and Walker Fanns.

Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support ot-lts Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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allows for two additional one year extensions of the Sublease. (ld. at Sec. 3 of Sublease).
The Sublease further provides that: "It is understood and agreed that (Walker Farms) is
subleasing the premises hereinafter described from (Steel Farms) as a sublessee subject to
the terms and provisions (~f the Lease.") (emphasis added) (ld. at Sec. 1 of the

Sublease.) Section 2 of the Sublease states the following:
It is specifically understood and agreed that Sublessee (Walker Farms) shall not
acquire any greater rights in the Premises than that which is held by Sublessor
(Steel Farms) pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Lease. (emphasis
added.) (ld.).

4. Lawful and Environmental use Reguirements
The Lease contains the following terms and conditions in regard to the use of the
property:
a. Page 1 of the Lease indicates the tenant's use of the property as "any lawful
purpose."
b. 7.3.1. of the Lease requires the tenant to keep the property in "a clean and
wholesome condition, free of any objectionable noises, odors or nuisances.

c. 7.3.3. of the Lease prohibits the tenant from "doing" or "permitting" the
property being used "for any unlawfit! or objectionable purposes" or "commit or
stiffer to be committed any waste in or upon the premises."

d. 7.3.4. of the Lease provides that the tenant "not use the Premises or permit
anything to be done in or about the premises which will in any way conflict with
any law, statute, ordinance or governmental rule or regulation or requirement of
duly constituted public authorities now in force or which may hereafter be enacted
or promulgated." The section further provides that "tenant at its sole cost and
expense shall promptly comply with all laws, statutes, ordinances and
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support qf
/
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governmental rules, regulations or requirements now in force or which may
hereafter be in force."
(V. Mathews aff. Ex. B "Lease"; see also Olsen Aff. Ex. A. "Modified Lease).

5. Default Provisions of Lease
The Lease provides the following relevant provisions constituting "material
default" by the tenant:
a. 17.1.2. The repudiation ofthis Lease by Tenant, any action by Tenant which

renders performance by Tenant of its obligations under this lease impossible, or
any action by Tenant which demonstrates an intent by Tenant not to perform an

obligation under this lease or not to continue with the peliormance of obligations
under this lease. (Emphasis added).
b. 17.1.4. A failure by Tenant to observe and perform any other provision of this
lease to be observed or performed by Tenant or any provision of the obligations to
be observed or performed by tenant, where such failure continues for thirty (30)
days after written notice thereof by landlord to tenant.
c. As a remedy to the default, Croft & Reed is entitled to "terminate tenant's right
to possession" of the property and to recover damages for the tenant's default.
(17.3.1. and 17.3.2).
d. In regard to the Option, the Lease indicates in Section 19.9.4 that Steel Farm's
right to exercise such option is "suspended' and that Steel Farms "shall not have
the right to exercise the Option while (Steel Farms) is in default in performing any
of the provisions of this lease to be performed by (Steel Farms) whether or not a

notice ofdefault has been served by the (Croft & Reed) spec(fying such defaults."
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in SUppAJi of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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This section further states that Steel Farm's "right to exercise the Option is

cancelled in the event qlthe termination qlthe cancellation o/the term as herein
provided."
rd. (emphasis added.).

6. Lease Violations
On or about November 25, 2008, and again on December 6, 2008, Croft & Reed
conducted an inspection of the leased property and discovered several major violations of
the Lease. (V. Mathews Aff.

~'!

16-20; R. Mathews Aff.

~~

4-10). Croft & Reed agents

discovered and photographed a man-made pit where solid waste was being deposited. In
the pit were various trash items, including used drums, fuel containers and piping. (Id.)
Croft & Reed also discovered and photographed several containers that were overflowing
with used oil. (Id.) Croft & Reed also found and photographed a water pump that was
leaking oil and other hazardous materials into the ground. (Id.) Croft & Reed also
observed that several of the facilities on the property belonging to Croft & Reed were
neglected and in disrepair. (Id.) It was apparent to Croft & Reed that these activities by
their nature had been occurring for quite a while, and perhaps through much of the term
of the lease. (Id.) After internally discussing these activities and reviewing the provisions
of the Lease, Croft & Reed subsequently sent Steel Farms a "Notice of Termination of
Lease" dated December 29,2008, citing such defaults, and sent the same notice to
Walker Land on January 13,2009. (Id. Olsen Aff. Ex. B).
Croft & Reed's attorney, Nathan Olsen, sent a letter dated December 29,2008, to
counsel for Steel Farms informing them of these material defaults and that Steel Farms
was therefore prohibited from exercising the option pursuant to 19.9.4 of the Lease. (Id.
Ex. C). Olsen urged Steel Farms to remove a "Notice of Option" that had been recorded
Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Supp,qrt afits Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
~
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in Bonneville County by Steel Farms on December 3,2008, which was in effect
preventing Croft & Reed from marketing the property for sale. (Olsen Aft'. Ex. C).
Notwithstanding their full awareness of their default under the Lease, Steel Farms did not
remove the Notice of Option, and instead proceeded with the underlying legal action
against Croft & Reed, which has further clouded the title to the property and prevented
Croft & Reed from marketing or even leasing the property. (V. Mathews AfT.

~

21).

Croft & Reed has conducted follow up inspections of the property. Neither Steel
Farms nor Walker Farms took any action to address any of the defaults within 30 days of
receiving notice of the default. (V. Mathews Aft'.

~'l

16-20; R. Mathews Aft'.

~~

4-10).

Croft & Reed also inspected the property on April 24, 2009, (R. Mathews Aff.

~

10.) Several canisters were found strewn about the premises. (Id.) Upon closer
examination, Croft & Reed noticed that the canisters were a highly toxic and hazardous
pesticide substance called "Fumitoxin." The label on the canister contains several strict
warnings about the hazardous nature and proper storage of the toxin, including the
possibility of serious injury or death if such warnings are not strictly adhered to. (Id.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving pmiy is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law." JOAHOR. ClY. P. 56(c); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,
516-17 (Idaho 1991). It is recognized that when assessing the motion for summary
judgment, the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party.
G & A! Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School
Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874 (Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121
Croft & Reed, Inc.'5 Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
5
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Idaho 463 (Idaho 1992).
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of
material fact. Tingly v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89 (Idaho 1994). The non-moving party
must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the
moving party's motion. Olsen v. .fA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990)

(citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,
102 (Idaho 1988).

ARGUMENT
I.

The Lease should be enforced as written.

Croft & Reed's legal basis for its motion is the basic legal doctrine that valid
contracts should be enforced as written. Contracts create a "legal duty in the promisor"
and a "right in the promise" which therefore provides a "right to enforce the contract."

Steiner Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002),
World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986).
Furthermore, in the basic tenets of contract law, it is established that contract
language "should be interpreted most strongly against the drafting party." Morgan v.

Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976 (l948). In addition, "a
contract will be construed most strongly against the party whose attorney drew or
prepared it." Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360, 387 P.2d 366 (l963). Thus, since
Steel Farms employed its own attorney to draft the lease document, it should be
construed most strongly against Steel Fanl1s, including provisions that might nullify and
invalidate certain parts of the contract.
II.

Steel Farms is expressly prohibited from exercising the option during

a holdover period.
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in SUPPfffits Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
~
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A.

The Lease term was four years.

The Lease which was set to expire on March 1, 2008, was never extended,
therefore disallowing Steel Farms from exercising the option. The Lease signed in 2004
between Croft & Reed and Steel Farms was clearly and unambiguously set to expire on
March 1, of2008. The date of the term in the type written agreement is stated as being
from the effective date of the agreement, April 22, 2004, to March 1, 2008. (See Sec. 3.1
of Lease). The term of the lease was further affirmed on the summary page of the
agreement which is stated as "four years." (Page 1 of Lease).
Moreover, Steel Farms admitted in its verified complaint that the tenn of the
Lease was four years. (See Steel Farms Cmplt.

~~

6 and 8) Statements made in a verified

complaint are judicial admissions of acts conclusively established and admissible in
evidence, Swanson v. State of Idaho, 83 Idaho 126, 129; 358 P.2d 387,288 (1960) The
pleadings may be relied upon by the court for purposes of summary judgment. Esser
Electric v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc. Idaho Supreme Court Slip Opinion

May 15, 2008 ID - 1w080516124. The combination of Steel Farms' admission, as
concurred by Croft & Reed makes it is undisputable that the parties entered into nothing
more than a four year lease.
Of further note, Steel Farms' verified complaint is dated December 22,2008. The
alleged Lease with certain notations made by Kevin Steel and Virginia Mathews in April
2006 is also attached and incorporated with the Complaint. Thus, from the outset of this
case, notwithstanding any hand written notations or modifications to the Lease, Steel
Farms has admitted that the Lease was four years - ending in March of2008, not 2009.
B.

The Lease anticipates a holdover period and prevents Steel Farms

from exercising the option during the holdover period.
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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The Lease anticipates the distinct possibility of a holdover period indicating that
the annual rent during the term of the agreement ar any haldover to be $40,000. (Sec. 3.1
Of Lease) The contract also defines what constitutes holdover - as when the tenant (Steel
Fan11s) "remains in possession of the premises after the expiration of the term ... with ar

.vithaut the express or implied consent af the landlord (Croft & Reed). (Sec. 20.11 of
Lease). This provision further makes clear that such a consent shall not be construed as a

"renewal or an extensianfar anyfurther term." (Id.)
The Lease strictly prohibits Steel Farms from exercising an option to buy the
property during a holdover period. The agreement only allows Steel Farms to exercise
the option during the term of the lease or any extension of the lease, and specifically
states that this opportunity is excluded during any holdover term. (Sec. 19.9.1 of Lease).
At no point have the parties agreed to an extension of the Lease beyond March 1, 2008.
Croft & Reed may have allowed Steel Fanns to remain on the property after March 1,
2008, but such express or implied consent does not amount to an extension of the tenn.
C.

The Lease has never been extended thus preventing Steel Farms from

exercising the Option.
Pursuant to Section 2004 of the Lease, any alterations to the agreement can only
occur in a separate "instrument in writing" signed by the parties. In addition, Croft &
Reeds bylaws during the relevant periods required that an "instruments" or "contracts"
regarding the corporation must be approved in writing by Croft & Reed's president and
the board. In Idaho, corporate bylaws provide the rules and designated authority to bind
and protect the interests of the corporation. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-841 (2008)
Thus, according to Section 2004 of the Lease, Croft & Reed's bylaws, and Idaho
law any scribbled modifications made by Virginia Mathews and Kevin Steel in April of
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
5 1q
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2006 were not valid. Moreover, Virginia Mathews was not an authorized director or
agent for Croft & Reed with signature authority at the time the notations were made. Her
mother, Venna Reed, was at that time still living and the sole Director and President of
corporation? Kevin Steel's perception or interpretation of what he thought Virginia
Mathew's authority was does not change the requirements and protections provided
under Section 20.4 of the Lease, Croft & Reed's bylaws and Idaho statute as to what was
necessary for a modification to the Lease.
As according to the written contract, the period after March 1, 2008, in which
Steel Farms occupied the property, can only be construed as a holdover period. Steel
Farms is expressly forbidden by Section 19.9.1 of the Lease to exercise the option during
the holdover period. The Court has a duty to enforce the contract as written. Steiner

Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002), World Wide
Lease. Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986). There is no material dispute
over whether the Lease was extended pursuant to the requirements of Section 20.4 of the
lease and therefore Croft & Reed's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720 (Idaho 1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102 (Idaho 1988).
D.

Steel Farm's Sublease with Walker Land is not an extension of the

lease.

Steel Farms cannot argue that the 2006 Sublease between Steel Farms and Walker
Land was an extension of the Lease term. Although the Sublease allows Walker Land an

2

During the same month (April 2006) that Virginia Mathews and Kevin Steel made the hand written
notations to the Lease, Venna Reed - the actual authorized representative for Croft & Reed - signed and
notarized the Sublease with Walker Land and Steel Farms. Thus, Steel Farms was perfectly aware that
Venna was available and the authorized person to sign documents.

Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
CS 1 d.
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option to extend their sublease through March 1,2009, Section 1 of the Sublease states
that the sublease it is subject to the Lease.
The Sublease does not expressly absolve Steel Farms from any of their
obligations under the Lease. Nor does the Sublease alter any provisions found in the
Lease, including expressly extending the term of the Lease. In fact, the Sublease
expressly provides that: "It is understood and agreed that (Walker Farms) is subleasing
the premises hereinafter described from (Steel Farms) as a sublessee subject to the terms
and provisions of the Lease.") (Sec. 1 of the Sublease.)
Moreover, the Sublease specifically limits the rights of Sublease to the rights held
in the Lease, in declaring that:
It is specifically understood and agreed that Sublessee (Steel Farms) shall not
acquire any greater rights in the Premises than that which is held by Sublessor
(Steel Farms) pursuant to the terms and provisions of the Lease. (emphasis
added.)

(Id at Sec. 2.)

Although Croft & Reed acknowledged the Sublease, the Sublease only deals with
rights and obligations belonging to Steel Farms, not Croft & Reed. Croft & Reed's rights
and obligations are preserved in the Lease, and Steel Farms cannot contract Croft &
Reed's rights and obligations away. Any interpretation of the Sublease that would
interfere with or alter Croft & Reed's rights under the Lease would be invalid. Therefore,
notwithstanding the Sublease, there was still no extension of the Lease and no right for
Steel Farms to exercise the option.

E. The parties merely agreed to a lease with an option to purchase that could
only occur if the lease term was extended, a purpose that Steel Farms must
accept and the Court must enforce.
Croft & Reed, Inc. 's Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
;::>
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"The court's objective in constructing a contract is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the parties." George v. University of Idaho , 121 Idaho 30, 35, 822 P. 2d
549,554 eCt. App. 1991). "If the contract is clear and unambiguous, the court gives
effect to the language employed according to its ordinary meaning." Dille v. Doerr
Distributing Co., 125 Idaho 123, 125 eCt. App. 1993). In construing unambiguous terms
of a contract, the court ascertains the parties' intent from the language contained in the
contract. George, 121 Idaho at 35. The Lease, as agreed in writing by the parties, simply
did not allow Steel Farms to exercise the Option unless the term of the lease was
extended. In effect, the Lease was nothing more than a four your lease with an option to
purchase that could only occur if Croft & Reed agreed in writing to extend the lease.
Moreover, because Steel Farms attorney drafted the Lease, its terms must be
construed most strongly against Steel Farms. Underwood v. Sterner, 63 Wash. 2d 360,
387 P.2d 366 (1963). As the drafter of the agreement, Steel Farms and its attorney have
the ultimate control and bargaining power to draft the document to their advantage. They
must therefore bear the burden for any provisions in the contract that may in the end as
written cannot be construed as they had intended. In essence, Steel Farms and/or its
attorney must suffer the consequences for any alleged errors they made in a contract they
drafted, not Croft & Reed.
It would also be inappropriate for Steel Farms to urge the Court to alter the
contract, particularly since it has admitted to the Court that the lease term was four years,
a fact that is now indisputable. Further, "for over 100 years, the (Idaho) supreme court
has held that a contract for the sale of real property must speak for itself and that a court
may not admit parol evidence to supply any terms of the contract." Ray v. Frasure, 145
Idaho 625, 628; 200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2009). The Lease itself disallows parol evidence
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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to interpret the agreement. (Sec. 2004) In essence, the Lease (with its Option or purchase
contract) speaks for

itselt~

and the Court must enforce the agreement as it is written.

In addition, Steel Farms cannot make the extraordinary request that the
agreement be modified because of "mutual mistake." Again, the parties have already
mutually agreed that the lease was four years. In any case, Steel Farms bears the burden
of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the mistake was made by both parties.
O'Connor v. Harger Comdr., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846,851 (2008). This is

simply an impossible task for Steel Farms because the original persons involved with the
contract for Croft & Reed, Dick and Venna Reed are deceased and not available to
testify.
It is entirely conceivable that Dick Reed's intent was to establish a lease only,

with the possibility of an option to purchase in the event that the lease was extended.
This would have 1) assured that an annual income stream would continue to support his
widow Venna after Dick's death, but yet 2) empowered Croft & Reed to ultimately
detennine whether Steel Farms could exercise the Option by granting Steel Farms an
extension on the lease. In the end, it does not matter. Dick and Venna's intent
accompanied them to the grave. The only reliable evidence in regard to alleged mistakes
or intent that remains is the written agreement, which speaks for itself, and which bars
Steel Farms from exercising the Option because the lease was never extended. Croft &
Reed's motion for summary judgment should be granted.

III.

Steel Farm's violation of the assignment or transfer prohibitions of its

interests voids the Option.
Regardless of whether the Lease was ever extended, the Lease explicitly and
broadly prevents Steel Farms from transferring or burdening its interests under the Lease
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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or Option. Steel Farms agreed under Section 19.13 of the Lease that it would not "sell or
contract to sell or assign or contract to assign or otherwise transfer or hypothecate or
assign as security or pledge or otherwise encumber (Steel Farms') interest in the Option
or the Premises or any part thereof separate from this lease without first obtaining the
written consent of (Croft & Reed.)" The violation of this provision results in the
immediate termination of the Option. (Id.)
Steel Farms clearly breached this provision on April 18th of 2006, when it entered
into an "Option to Purchase Real Property" (Walker Option) with Walker Land. Pursuant
to Steel Farms' interest provided in its Option with Croft & Reed, the Walker Option
commits Steel Farms to sell the leased property to Walker Land for $832,830. The
Walker Option was signed by both Steel Farms and Walker Land, but not Croft & Reed?
By entering into this contract with Walker Land, Steel Farms encumbered both its interest
in the Option and the property in direct violation of Section 19.13 of the Lease. The
consequence - as agreed to by the parties in the written agreement - is the immediate
termination of the Option. The Court should enforce the contract by nullifYing the
Option. Steiner Investments v. Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho

2002), World Wide Lease, Inc. v. Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986)

IV.

Steel Farm's Lease default has cancelled the right to an option and

has damaged Croft & Reed.

3

It should be disconcerting to the Court about how the various transactions were conducted by Steel Fam1s
in April, 2006. Steel Farms attempted to have the Lease modified by handwritten initials in the front
hallway of Virginia Mathews home, notwithstanding the fact that Venn a Reed was available and had
undergone the formal process of the legal review and notarized signing of the Sublease with Walker
Land. Steel Farms then entered into a separate formal and fully notarized agreement with Walker Land
to encumber its interests in the Option, without any notice or signed authorization from either Venna
Reed or Virginia Mathews. This conduct suggests the distinct possibility that Steel Farms was aware of
and was intentionally subverting the restrictions and authorization requirements of the Lease for its own
gain and to the detriment of Croft & Reed. Steel Farms' improprieties should not be rewarded.
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Whether or not the Lease was extended beyond March 1,2008, Steel Farms
defaulted on the Lease by permitting unlawful acts on the property. The Lease's
holdover provision provides that notwithstanding a holdover period, "such tenancy shall
be subject to every other term, covenant and agreement contained herein." (Sec. 20.11 of
Lease). On November 25,2008 and December 62008, Croft & Reed inspected the
property being leased by Steel Farms and discovered several violations of the Lease.

A.

Unlawful environmental actions and conditions found on the

property.
Steel Fanns permitted several violations of U.S. and Idaho laws in regard to the
storage and management of waste and hazardous materials. I.C. 31-4410 prohibits the
"throwing away, dumping, discarding, any type or nature of solid waste" on the "private
land of another." I.C. 31-4410 A violation of this law subjects the otlending person to
civil and even criminal penalties. Id. "Solid waste" under Idaho statute includes any
"discarded material including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material
resulting f1:om industrial, commercial, mining and agricultural operations and from
community activities ... "I.C. 31-4401 (50).
Croft & Reed clearly found solid waste dumped or discarded on their property in
violation ofI.C. 31-4401. As evidenced by the photographs taken of the property,
various types of waste and perhaps hazardous waste were deposited in a man-made pit.
This waste included used drums, fuel containers, pipes and furniture. These wastes were
the result of commercial and/or agricultural activities on the property, and were either
caused or permitted by the tenant Steel Farms. These violations are serious, and warrant
possible civil and criminal consequences.
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There are also strict requirements imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and enforced by the State ofIdaho in regard to the storage and use of oil
and fuel. Part 112 of the EPA's regulations on the protecting the environment and water
pollution contains provision in regard to oil pollution prevention. 40 CFR 112.1 et al.
Part 112.7 of those regulations contains general regulations for oil "spill prevention,
control, and countermeasure plans." Id. Part 279 of these regulations contain
requirements for the "management of used oil." 40 CFR 279.1 et al. ..
The EPA's environmental regulations as well as additional Idaho regulations are
implemented by the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) through the
"Environmental Protection and Health Act" (EHPA) I.C. 39-117, et aI... and the
Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA) I.C. 39-4415 et al ... These Acts provide
DEQ with the authority to monitor and enforce both civil and criminal penalties for
activities which violate environmental protection laws or threatens the environment. Id.
One ofDEQ's "basic environmental regulations" is the storage and disposal of
hazardous waste and used oil. See, "Basic Environmental Regulations: What Every
Facility Needs to Know" published by the Idaho DEQ, and found on
www.deq.idaho.gov. lists DEQ's relevant prohibited activities and/or requirements for
these hazardous agents are as follows (See Olsen Aff. Ex. D):
1.

Hazardous materials must be stored and disposed of properly.

2.

Disposal of hazardous waste by burning, spilling on or burying in the

ground or by evaporation is prohibited.
3.

Storage containers must be in good condition and properly labeled, with

lids closed, and open to inspection from all sides.
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4.

Used oil must be stored only in tanks or containers that are in good

condition and do not leak.
5.

"Used Oil" must be clearly marked and visible on all above-ground

storage tanks, containers, and fill pipes for underground tanks.
6.

Disposal of used oil in a surface impoundment such as a ditch, pond or

low spot is prohibited.
7.

All releases or spills of used oil must be cleaned up within 24 hours. Id.

It appears that all of these environmental requirements were violated. As

evidenced by Croft & Reed's observations and photographs of the site, used oil was
stored in containers what were in poor condition and were leaking. This oil was not
clearly marked. It appears that some oil was disposed in a low spot (the pit). The spilled
oil was not cleaned up within 24 hours. It is also apparent from the photographs taken by
Croft & Reed that hazardous waste, i.e. fuel and other fluids, were allowed to spill onto
the ground from the water pump.
B.

Steel Farms' material breaches and default of the Lease.

Both the open garbage dump and the oil and hazardous waste violations were
clear violations of the law and therefore violations of the Lease. Steel Farms failed to
keep the property in a "clean and wholesome condition" as required by Section 7.3.1. of
the Lease. Moreover, Steel Farms permitted the property from being used "for any
unlawful or objectionable purpose, and "suffered to be committed" waste on the property
in violation of7.3.3. of the Lease. Moreover, Steel Farms permitted activities on the
property which conflicted with the laws, statutes, and or governmental regUlations. (Sec.
7.3.4 of Lease).
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These defaults essentially made performance by Steel Farms of its obligations
impossible or are a clear demonstration of intent by Steel Farms not to perform or
continue in the performance of their obligations under the Lease. (Sec. 17.1.2 of Lease).
This warranted an immediate termination of the Lease by Croft & Reed. Nevertheless,
after receiving notice of these violations on December 29,2008, Steel Farms failed to
take any action to remedy these violations, thus terminating the Lease pursuant to Section
17.1.3.
C.

The termination and default under the Lease cancels Steel Farm's

right to the option.

Pursuant to 19.9.4 of the Lease, Steel Farms is prohibited from exercising the
option when the lease is terminated. The lease has been terminated and Steel Farms
there tore has no right to purchase Croft & Reed's property. In any case, Section 19.9.4
of the Lease "suspends" Steel Farm's right to the option when they are in default of the
Lease - whether or not they received notice of default.
Croft & Reed learned of Steel Farm's default on November 25,2008. Steel
Farms recorded a Notice of Option (Notice) in the public record on December 3, 2008,
even though they had no right to such option. This Notice should have been immediately
removed when Steel Farms was notified of their default and termination oflease on
December 29,2008. Nevertheless, Steel Farms not only failed to remove the Notice, they
took no action to address the Lease violations. Moreover, they took the additional step of
initiating this action against Croft & Reed knowing full well of their violations of the
Lease and cancelled option rights.
Whether or not Steel Farms believes that a cancellation of the option is "fair" or
warranted, the terms of the Lease make it clear that they cannot exercise the option when
Croft & Reed, Inc.'s Memorandum in Support of its Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
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they are in default of the Lease. Pursuant to long standing principles of contract law, and
assuming Steel Farm's position that the Lease is valid, the terms of the contract
preventing the exercise of the option should and must be enforced. Steiner Investments v.

Ziegler-Tamura LTD., CO., 138 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2002), World Wide Lease, Inc. v.
Woodworth, 111 Idaho 880 (Ida. App. 1986). Given the strong and compelling evidence
of the unlawful activities and Lease violations occurring on the property, there is no
material dispute over whether Steel Farms was in default of that Lease and therefore are
prohibited from exercising the option. Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720
(Idaho 1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks,
115 Idaho 101, 102 (Idaho 1988).

V. Steel Farms' violations of the Lease have damaged Croft & Reed.
Steel Farm's recording of the Notice and its subsequent actions have damaged
Croft & Reed, and slandered the title to its property. Croft & Reed has been unable to
proceed with the marketing of the property. Croft & Reed has also been unable to lease
the property because of the cloud of uncertainty cause by Steel Farms.
Moreover, Steel Farms is liable for its breach of contract, i.e. via the unlawful
activities and environmental harms. Such breaches may have devalued the property and
will result in significant clean up and repair costs. Croft & Reed is entitled to damages,
the amount to be determined in a later proceeding.

CONCLUSION
Because of the aforementioned facts and law, which are not in dispute, Croft &
Reed's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. Steel Farms' Notice should be
removed and Steel Farms should be held liable for damages caused by its breach of
contract and slander of Croft & Reed's title.
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